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 Is Truth a Form Inherent in ings? Lawrence Dewan 
and De veritate, Question 1, Article 4
Nelson Ramirez
Sam Houston State University
Huntsville, TX
The purpose of this essay is to look at whether Aquinas 
teaches in De veritate [DV], q. 1, a. 4, that truth is a form inherent in 
things. I take up this investigation because I am examining Lawrence 
Dewan’s account of Aquinas’s teaching on truth.1 On Dewan’s account, a 
signi>cant development occurs in Aquinas’s teaching as regards truth as 
it is found in things. Before the Summa theologiae [ST], Aquinas thought 
that in addition to truth being in the intellect, it was also in things. In 
ST, most explicitly in I, q. 16, a. 6, Aquinas no longer thinks that it is 
in things, but only in the mind. When Dewan says that before the ST 
truth is “in things” and in the ST it is not “in things,” in both cases, by 
“in things,” Dewan means “as a form inherent in things.” What exactly 
this means for Dewan will be gradually brought out as I examine the text 
Dewan thinks most clearly teaches that truth is a form inherent in things: 
DV, q. 1, a. 4. 
?e essay will be divided into two parts. In the >rst part, I will lay out 
Dewan’s reading of DV, q. 1, a. 4, and why he thinks it de>nitely teaches 
that truth is a form inherent in things. In the second part, I suggest an 
1   To my knowledge, only J. A. Aertsen has replied to Dewan’s reading of Aquinas 
on truth; see Aertsen, “Is Truth not a Transcendental for Aquinas?” in Wisdom’s 
Apprentice: !omistic Essays in Honor of Lawrence Dewan, O.P. (Washington, 
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007). In this article, Aertsen replies 
to Lawrence Dewan, O.P., “Is Truth a Transcendental for St. ?omas Aquinas?,” 
Nova et Vetera (English) 2, no. 1 (2004): 1–20. Aertsen, however, does not exam-
ine Dewan’s actual argument, which is based on his reading of De veritate [DV], q. 
1, a. 4. ?e present article examines Dewan’s argument. 
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alternative reading of the text, >rst based just on the article 4 text itself and 
then based on other texts throughout Aquinas’s works. 
Dewan’s Reading of De veritate, Q. 1, A. 4
?is article in DV is not the only text where, according to Dewan, Aqui-
nas is thinking of truth, as found in things, as an inherent form in things. 
Dewan cites other texts from Aquinas’s Commentary on the Sentences and 
other places in DV. I focus on this text because Dewan himself singles it 
out as “de>nitely teach[ing] that truth is a form inherent in things, even if 
one identical with the entity of things.”2 Regarding the other texts, Dewan 
does not seem to be as sure as he is with this one. Why Dewan seems surer 
on this DV text will be brought out. 
First, the Latin in article 4 in which Dewan sees Aquinas teaching that 
truth is a form inherent in things is: 
Denominantur autem res verae a veritate quae est in intellectu 
divino vel in intellectu humano sicut denominatur cibus sanus a 
sanitate quae est in animali et non sicut a forma inhaerente; sed a 
veritate quae est in ipsa re, quae nihil aliud est quam entitas intel-
lectui adaequata vel intellectum sibi adaequans, denominatur sicut 
a forma inhaerente, sicut cibus denominatur sanus a qualitate sua, a 
qua sanus dicitur.3
?e text, in Dewan’s translation, is as follows:
For THINGS are called “true” from the truth which is in the divine 
intellect or in the human intellect [!] as food is called “healthy” 
from the health which is in the animal and NOT AS FROM AN 
INHERENT FORM; but from the TRUTH which is in the thing 
itself [a veritate quae est in ipsa re], which is nothing else but the 
entity [entitas] conformed with the intellect OR CONFORMING 
THE INTELLECT TO ITSELF, it is denominated AS FROM 
INHERENT FORM [sicut a forma inhaerente], just as food is called 
“healthy” from its own quality, from which it is called “healthy.”4
2  Dewan, “Is Truth a Transcendental for St. ?omas Aquinas?,” 11.
3  Unless otherwise noted, the Latin from De veritate is taken from the Leonine 
edition (vol. 22). 
4  Dewan, “Is Truth a Transcendental for St. ?omas Aquinas?,” 10–11 (all-caps and 
italics original to Dewan).
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Dewan goes on to say regarding this text: 
It is not the >rst part of this that surprises, for it is the usual doctrine 
of how things are called “healthy” (though I once again salute the 
relation to both intellects). It is the startling assertion that food can 
be called “healthy,” not merely relative to the health of the animal, 
as causing it, but also in itself, based on its own quality. Why would 
one call something not taken in relation to the animal “food,” let 
alone “healthy”? We do not >nd this doctrine elsewhere in ?omas, 
as far as I know. It seems designed to make possible a doctrine of an 
intrinsic form of truth in things, even if identical with the entity of 
the thing.5 
In an earlier article of Dewan, he also comments on this passage: “?omas 
is ready to grant a usage according to which there is a formality within the 
thing itself, whereby it is called ‘true’: this ‘truth’ is the thing’s own enti-
tas, and is as multiple as there are things.”6 Dewan also comments on this 
passage in yet another article of his: 
?is is di\cult to cope with. It appears that the second part of the 
statement is at odds with the >rst part.7 ?e second part still seems 
to be about something called “truth” in the thing and so called as 
related to the two intellects. How, then, is it being called “truth” as 
"om an inherent form. It seems one should say, rather, that it is being 
called “being” as from an inherent form, and that form is that in 
virtue of which it is called “true” relative to intellect. ?at is what 
?omas will say in ST 1.16.6.8
I will focus on Dewan’s >rst comment, for only there he seems to give 
the reason why this passage de>nitely teaches that truth is a form inherent 
in things. ?e reason goes back to Aquinas’s remarks about “healthy.” 
5  Dewan, “Is Truth a Transcendental for St. ?omas Aquinas?,” 11.
6  Lawrence Dewan, O.P., “St. ?omas’s Successive Discussions of the Nature of 
Truth,” Studi tomistici 58 (1995): 153–68, at 167. 
7  ?e >rst part Dewan is referring to is one not quoted in the other two articles 
where Dewan treats this passage. ?e passage is as follows, in Dewan’s translation: 
“If ‘truth’ is taken as improperly said (improprie dicta), in which way all are called 
‘true,’ thus of several (things) there are several truths, but of one true (thing) only 
one truth” (Lawrence Dewan, O.P., “A Note on Metaphysics and Truth,” Doctor 
Communis, n.s., 2 [2002]: 143–53, at 151). 
8  Dewan, “Note on Metaphysics and Truth,” 151.
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Dewan thinks that Aquinas is using “healthy” as said of food in order to 
explain how truth is a form inherent in things. According to Dewan, what 
is it that Aquinas is saying about “healthy” as said of food? As he states it: 
“It is the startling assertion that food can be called ‘healthy,’ not merely 
relative to the health of the animal, as causing it, but also in itself, based on 
its own quality. Why would one call something not taken in relation to the 
animal ‘food,’ let alone ‘healthy’?” So, it seems that Dewan is saying that 
Aquinas thinks that food can be called healthy apart from any relation to 
the health that it causes in the animal; food can be called healthy just on 
account of itself, its own quality. 
If that is what Aquinas is saying, Dewan seems right in saying that it is 
a startling assertion if one goes by what could perhaps be said intuitively 
about the matter. As Dewan asks very well, “why would one call some-
thing not taken in relation to the animal ‘food,’ let alone ‘healthy’?” It 
seems that something is not called food unless one knows what it feeds or 
nourishes, or who or what eats it. We can con>dently say that dead bodies 
are food because we know that there are animals, such as vultures, that eat 
and nourish themselves from dead bodies. We cannot go around labeling 
things as food unless we know the animal or plant or living organism it 
nourishes. It seems that Dewan is correct in thinking that, indeed, one 
should not call something not taken in relation to a living organism “food.” 
Food is always food for some living organism, and if we know that some-
thing cannot be eaten, we say that it is not food. 
?e same seems to apply to “healthy.” We think that something is 
healthy for some living organism. To say just that “this is healthy,” “that is 
healthy,” or its opposite, “that is unhealthy,” is strictly speaking incomplete. 
Unless it is clear from the context, we would be le_ wondering, “healthy 
or unhealthy for who or what organism?” When the >rst humans were out 
looking for things to eat, many of the plants, fruits, and things of that sort 
they saw were unknown to them. ?ey could not at that point say whether 
those things were healthy or unhealthy, or even whether it was food for 
them or not. ?at could only be said once they had tried the unknown 
things and no harm came about as a result, but rather nourishment; then 
they could say, “Food!” or “this is healthy,” or “this is unhealthy”—in other 
words, “healthy or unhealthy for us.”9
9  Incidentally, it seems that this would be the >rst reason for calling something 
healthy, from the ezect of the food. Only later would one know the reason why 
this food is healthy, and this would involve a quality or characteristic of the food 
itself, such as that it is rich in calcium, or that it is composed solely of carbohy-
drates, or that it is pure protein, and so forth. ?is idea will be developed later on. 
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So, it seems that “food” and “healthy” are relatively said, that is, not said 
of something except in relation to something other than the thing it is said 
of. Acorns are said to be food only in relation to something other than the 
acorn itself, such as a squirrel. Likewise, calcium is said to be healthy only 
in relation to something other than the calcium itself, such as a human 
being. Healthy (as said of food)10 is not like white, which can be said of 
something not in relation to something other than the thing it is said of; 
for example, white (referring to skin color) can be said of a person just in 
himself (or a polar bear), without having to bring in anything other than 
the person himself. When I say that “he is white,” I do not mean that he 
is white in relation to this or that other thing. He is white in himself. In 
contrast, when I say “this food is healthy,” though we do speak like that, 
in reality we mean “this food is healthy for men, or for me, or for so and so.” 
?e food does not seem to be healthy in itself, like the man (or polar bear) 
is white in himself. Or to put it perhaps as Dewan might put it, “healthy” 
is said of food not because of an intrinsic form in the food, such as some 
quality it has, as white is said of a man because of an intrinsic form in the 
man, namely, his whiteness (or more precisely, the whiteness of his skin), 
a quality the man possesses apart from any relation to something else. But 
according to Dewan, Aquinas seems to be saying just this, namely, that 
healthy can be said of food like white is said of a man, that is, because of 
an intrinsic form in the food, or a form inherent in the food (these two 
expressions seem to be used synonymously by Dewan), independent of 
something other than the food, in this case, an animal, to which food is 
related, hence the “startling” nature of Aquinas’s remark. 
?at Dewan is interpreting Aquinas to be saying this seems manifest 
from what he says in the passage quoted above: “Why would one call some-
thing not taken in relation to the animal [my emphasis] ‘food,’ let alone 
‘healthy’?” Dewan seems to think that Aquinas is calling food, not taken 
in relation to the animal, “healthy,” food as taken just in itself, based on its 
own quality, in the way in which a man is said to be white just in himself, 
based on his own quality and not in relation to something else. 
Dewan thinks these remarks of Aquinas on “healthy” said of food “seem 
designed to make possible a doctrine of an intrinsic form of truth in things, 
even if identical with the entity of the thing.” In other words, the purpose of 
these remarks on “healthy” said of food is to illuminate some other issue, 
namely, “true” as said of things. ?e example with “healthy” said of food 
is supposed to help us see, with something easier, what is happening at the 
10  For if we say “healthy” of the animal, then it is said of the animal like “white” 
would be said of a man. 
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level of truth, which is more di\cult to see. Aquinas seems to be setting 
up a proportion from something more known. Gathering from Dewan’s 
statements above, the argument seems to go like this. Just as food can 
be called healthy apart from any relation to an animal, so a thing can be 
called true apart from any relation to an intellect. ?is is possible because 
of something in the food itself apart from any relation to the health of an 
animal and something in a thing itself apart from any relation to an intel-
lect. ?is something in the food itself apart from any relation to the health 
of an animal is some quality of the food itself. ?is something in the thing 
itself apart from any relation to the truth of some intellect is the entity of 
the thing itself. ?e quality of the food and the entity of the thing are both 
inherent forms, on account of which the former is called healthy and the 
latter true. So, the basic thrust of the argument seems to be a proportion: 
“true” is to a thing as “healthy” is to food. ?e example with “healthy,” 
therefore, said of food is supposed to help us understand in some way a 
conclusion regarding true said of things, namely, that true can be said of 
things apart from any reference to some intellect, but simply on account of 
something in the thing itself, some inherent form. Understanding properly 
what is happening at the level of truth depends on understanding what is 
happening in the “healthy” example. 
Alternative Reading of the Text Based on the De veritate Text Itself: 
“Healthy” Said of Food11
Now, if the reason Dewan thinks that this passage “de>nitely teaches that 
truth is a form inherent in things, even if one identical with the entity of 
things,” is Aquinas’s use of “healthy” as said of food, then if Aquinas’s use 
of “healthy” as said of food can be understood dizerently, then perhaps 
Dewan’s conclusion will have to be reconsidered. 
?ough Dewan’s observation (“why would one call something not 
taken in relation to the animal ‘food,’ let alone ‘healthy’?”) is correct, as 
11  For another reading of DV, q. 1, a. 4 see John Wippel, “Truth in ?omas Aquinas,” 
!e Review of Metaphysics 34, no. 2 (1989): 295–326, at 316–20. Wippel sees 
Aquinas as concluding in this article that truth improperly speaking is intrinsic to 
things: “Again, we may ask, does it follow from this that truth of being is intrinsi-
cally present to them? No, ?omas would reply, if we take truth strictly (proprie) 
or according to its proper de>nition. Yes, he would answer, if we take truth broadly 
and improperly so as to identify it with the being of the thing which has the 
capacity to be understood by some intellect.” However, Wippel does not seem to 
understand “intrinsic to things” as Dewan does. Wippel does not address Dewan’s 
view, since Wippel wrote his article years before Dewan wrote his three articles on 
this topic. 
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shown above, it does not seem clear that that is what Aquinas is in fact 
saying in the passage. First, I will give a reason based on the text itself 
of DV, q. 1, a. 4, and then some reasons based on other texts throughout 
Aquinas’s works. 
It seems that Dewan is taking Aquinas’s words to be excluding any and 
all relations to an animal. Again, I gather this from his remark: “Why 
would one call something not taken in relation to the animal ‘food,’ let 
alone ‘healthy’?” Dewan seems to be saying that Aquinas is calling food 
“not taken in relation to the animal” healthy. Is that what Aquinas is 
doing? Is that what he actually says? Aquinas’s words are “sicut cibus 
denominatur sanus a qualitate sua, a qua sanus dicitur”: “just as food is 
denominated healthy from its own quality, from which it is called healthy.” 
At least in terms of the words themselves, Aquinas does not explicitly say 
“just as food, not taken in relation to the animal, is denominated healthy 
from its own quality, from which alone it is also called healthy.” So, why is 
Dewan interpreting Aquinas to be saying that “food, not taken in relation 
to the animal, is called healthy”? Where is he getting the “not taken in 
relation to the animal”?
Perhaps it could be objected that the distinction Aquinas is making 
prior to this statement12 has already implicitly established that Aquinas is 
taking healthy not in relation to the animal. Aquinas has already said that 
“things are denominated true from the truth which is in the divine intel-
lect or in the human intellect just as food is denominated healthy from the 
health which is in the animal and not as from an inhering form.”13 Aqui-
nas here is clearly taking healthy as said of food in relation to the health 
of the animal. But then he goes on to say, “but from the truth which is in 
the thing itself, which is nothing other than its entity conformed to an 
intellect or conforming an intellect to itself, a thing is denominated [true] 
as from an inhering form, just as food is denominated healthy from its 
own quality, from which it is called healthy.” Aquinas is clearly contrasting 
this last quoted part with the >rst. He begins this second part with the 
word “but,” which normally indicates some kind of opposition with what 
has been said. ?e contrast is that healthy in this second part is said of 
food on account of a quality in the food itself. Aquinas himself expresses 
the contrast more generally in terms of “inherent form.” In the >rst case, 
healthy is said of food “not as from an inherent form”; in the second, 
12  “Just as food is denominated healthy from its own quality, from which it is called 
healthy.” All translations in the present article are mine except where otherwise 
noted.
13  DV, q. 1, a. 4, resp. 
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healthy is said of food “as from an inherent form.” 
When Aquinas says in the >rst case that healthy is said of food “not as 
from an inherent form,” he means an inherent form in the food. ?e health 
of the animal, which in the >rst case is the reason for calling the food 
healthy, is not an inherent form in the food. ?e health of the animal is 
not in the food at all; it is in the animal, an inherent form14 in the animal. 
Food is related to the health of the animal insofar as the food can preserve 
or cause the health of the animal, but the health of the animal as such is 
not in the food at all, and that is why Aquinas says that in the >rst case 
food is called healthy not as from an inherent form. Now, because in the 
second case food is being called healthy on account of a quality in the food 
itself, it would be called healthy “as from an inherent form,” for a quality 
of the food itself would be a form inhering in the food itself. 
?e objection to myself—the rebuttal to my point that Aquinas does 
not explicitly say what Dewan claims him to say—can be summed up as 
follows. Aquinas seems to be saying that food can be called healthy in two 
ways: (1) from the health which is in the animal, and not as from an inher-
ent form (a sanitate quae est in animali et non sicut a forma inhaerente), and 
(2) from a quality in the food itself (a qualitate sua), as from an inherent 
form (sicut a forma inhaerente). ?e way Dewan seems to be understanding 
this distinction is that Aquinas is saying that food can be called healthy in 
two ways: (1) in relation to the animal, for the health of the animal is in the 
animal, and (2) not in relation to the animal, but in relation to food itself, 
for the quality of the food itself is not in the animal, but in the food. So, 
Dewan might say that, even though Aquinas does not explicitly say “just as 
food, not taken in relation to the animal, is denominated healthy from its 
own quality . . . ” the context of the contrast he is setting up clearly says so. 
However, there seems to be a problem with assuming that Aquinas is 
taking “food” in his original (2) in the previous paragraph not in relation 
to the animal (as Dewan’s (2) assumes he is doing with it). It seems that, 
by de>nition, as Dewan points out and is obvious to all, food is always 
food for some living organism. If I consider the grass in front of my house 
as grass, that consideration involves no relation to an animal. “Grass” as 
grass simply speaks to the nature of this thing considered in itself. But if I 
call the grass food, I necessarily bring in what the grass is food for, such as 
a cow. ?e grass cannot be thought of as food except in relation to some 
living organism which feeds on it, which eats it and gets nourishment from 
it, that is, which maintains or preserves its health from it. As it was said 
14  For those unfamiliar with Aquinas’s terminology, “inherent form” can be under-
stood as an intrinsic characteristic or feature. 
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earlier, food seems to be an essentially relative term. 
So, if Aquinas is indeed using the word “food” as we use the word food 
and understanding by “food” what we also understand by “food,” as when 
we say that grass is food for cows, then he must necessarily still be taking 
food in relation to an animal; but Aquinas is indeed using the word “food” 
in this common sense, for that is clearly the sense he uses it in the >rst part 
of the distinction, which Dewan thinks is correct. Why would he use the 
word “food” with a dizerent meaning in the second part of the distinc-
tion? Is Aquinas not distinguishing two ways in which one and the same 
thing (namely, food) can be called healthy? It seems that even Dewan’s very 
objection to Aquinas assumes that Aquinas is taking “food” in the same 
sense in both cases. So, it seems that Aquinas cannot possibly be saying—
as I modi>ed him in order to >t what Dewan is claiming—“just as food, 
not taken in relation to the animal, is called healthy from its own quality.” 
Food is taken in relation to the animal in the second part of the distinction 
as well as in the >rst. It has to be, if indeed he is talking about food as such. 
So, Aquinas is not considering food apart "om any relation to the animal 
in the second part. So, it should be said instead that food as food, meaning 
taken always in relation to the animal, is called healthy from its own qual-
ity. If there is any discrepancy in Aquinas’s use of the term from the >rst 
to the second part of the distinction, it would seem to be in the use of the 
word “healthy,” not “food.” 
Now, in the above objection to myself, I say that “Aquinas seems to 
be saying that food can be called healthy in two ways.” Strictly speaking, 
however, it does not seem that Aquinas is saying that food can be called 
healthy in two ways. Yes, there is indeed a two-ness here, a distinction, but 
it does not seem to be as regards two ways of calling food healthy. All Aqui-
nas says in this “distinction” is that food is called healthy "om the health 
which is in the animal, and then he adds that food is called healthy "om its 
own quality (which is, indeed, the very point or context of the distinction). 
?e two-ness is not in terms of opposition, an either/or, a disjunction,15 
15  Cruz Gonzalez Ayesta sees a two-ness here as well, though perhaps not the same 
two-ness that I am bringing out. Nevertheless, regarding the two things she sees 
here she makes a general remark that can be applied to the two elements I am 
bringing out—“to distinguish is not to separate nor to oppose” —and she proposes 
an interpretation of this passage in light of Anselm’s understanding of truth as a 
measure. Since her interpretation does not address Dewan’s interpretation in his 
most recent article, it does not seem relevant here. Later, however, when addressing 
Dewan’s talk of “extrinsic denomination,” her interpretation is relevant; see La 
verdad como bien según Tomás de Aquino (Pamplona, ES : Ediciones Universidad 
de Navarra, 2006), 179. 
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but is rather from two aspects or two elements of one thing, one relation. 
Food is called healthy, yes, from the health which is in the animal, and that 
seems obvious and unquestionable, as Dewan well notes, but food is called 
healthy from its own quality too, that is, from both of these “sides” or for 
both of these reasons. In other words, two things are involved in calling 
some food healthy. Food is denominated healthy "om two sources, not 
that food is denominated healthy in two ways, as if implying some sort of 
disjunction, either this or that, each su\cient on its own for calling food 
healthy, but not both. Perhaps it should be noticed that Aquinas does use 
the word “from” (ab) in both cases. Healthy said of food has two parts to 
it, two aspects, two causes: (1) the animal, or more generally, the living 
organism, and (2) the food itself, that is, the thing itself that is food for 
some living organism. 
?at this is so seems manifest from the way we speak. Liver, for exam-
ple, is said to be healthy for a pregnant woman—aspect/cause (1)—because 
of the high levels of iron it contains, which is aspect/cause (2). Healthy will 
always be healthy for this or that living organism, but the reason for some 
thing being healthy for this or that organism is also because of something 
in the thing. Aquinas says as much, regarding what I am calling the second 
aspect, in ST I, q. 16, a. 6, which treats the same issue as DV, q. 1, a. 4. 
?ough Aquinas does not mention food, he does mention the other things 
of which healthy is also said in relation to the one health of the animal, 
namely, medicine and urine. O_entimes Aquinas will explicitly mention 
food or diet along with medicine and urine;16 so what he says there about 
medicine and urine can be applied to food as well. He says in ST I, q. 16, 
a. 6, “and although health is not in medicine nor in urine, nevertheless in 
16  Aquinas o_en puts medicine, food/diet, and urine together when explaining anal-
ogous naming. See Summa contra gentiles I, ch. 34, no. 1: “In this way, therefore, 
from the aforesaid it remains that those things which are said of God and other 
things are predicated of them neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically, 
according to the order or respect to something one. Which indeed happens in two 
ways: in one way, according as many things have a respect to something one; for 
example, according to a relation to one health, the animal is called healthy as the 
subject of health, medicine [is called healthy] as productive [of health], food [is 
called healthy] as conservative [of health], urine as a sign of health.” 
  See also: Summa theologiae [ST] III, q. 60, a. 1, resp. “I answer it ought to be said 
that all things which have an order to something one, though in diverse ways, are 
able to be denominated from that one thing, just as from the health which is in 
the animal, not only is the animal—which is the subject of health—denominated 
healthy, but also medicine is called healthy inasmuch as it is productive of health, 
and the diet inasmuch as it preserves that health, and urine inasmuch as it signi>es 
the same health.”
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each of them there is something through which the former causes health, 
and the latter signi>es health.”17 Applying this to healthy said of food, one 
may thus paraphrase that, “although health is not in the food, neverthe-
less in it there is something through which it preserves the health of the 
animal.” So, for example, milk is said to be healthy for the bones—aspect 
(1)—"om/through the large amounts of calcium the milk has—aspect (2). 
Oranges are said to be very healthy for the immune system on account of 
some quality in the oranges themselves, namely, the vitamin C they have. 
Carrots are said to be healthy for the eyes on account of the vitamin A 
carrots provide. And just because I do not explicitly say “healthy” for this 
or that organism does not mean that I am excluding that element from 
the reasons for calling milk, oranges, or carrots healthy.18 It is implied 
or self-understood. Am I not allowed to say that oranges are healthy on 
account of their vitamin C? Are we only allowed to say that oranges are 
healthy because they make us healthy or preserve our health? If so, the 
question remains, but why are they healthy for us? So, food, which is always 
food for some animal, is indeed called healthy (and also unhealthy) from 
its own quality, but not just from its own quality. 
Perhaps for the sake of clarifying this point further, two additional things 
should be noted: >rst, that there seems to be an order in calling food healthy, 
an order that goes back to the order in which we know and name things: we 
name things as we know them. Now, we usually know ezects before causes, 
and therefore we would >rst name something by its ezects, rather than by its 
causes. As regards calling food healthy, it seems that it would >rst be named 
healthy from its ezects. If that new, unknown fruit or leaf or plant was eaten 
and did not make them sick, then it would be called good to eat, healthy; 
if not, then bad to eat, or unhealthy. ?e food would be called healthy 
or unhealthy from its ezect, namely, the preservation of the health of the 
people or the ruining of it. Only later would one come to know the reason 
why one plant was healthy and the other was not, that is, what was it about 
the plant, its properties or qualities that in one case caused health and in the 
other sickness, such as a toxin in the leaves. ?en, one would be able to call 
this plant unhealthy not only on account of the sickness it causes in us but 
also on account of its own properties: “It is unhealthy from the toxins in its 
leaves.” And we do speak like this in daily life, saying that so and so food is 
unhealthy because it has too much fat, or too much sugar, and so forth. 
17  ST I, q. 16, a. 6, resp. 
18  To not mention something is not to deny it. If in introducing myself to someone I 
mention that I am a philosopher but do not mention that I am a father, in leaving 
out that I am a father, I am not saying or implying that I am not a father. 
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A second thing to be noted is that, as pointed out earlier, “healthy” is 
said relatively, kind of like “large.” If I say that this cup is large, it is large 
with respect to something else. It implies a relation. And in every relation 
there are two terms or two extremes. In the relation of “healthy” as said of 
food,19 the relation is between food and the animal. Just as I am toward José 
María a father, milk is toward us healthy, a dead body is toward a vulture 
healthy, and so forth. “Father” expresses a relation that always involves the 
man who generated and the human being generated. Likewise, it seems 
that “healthy,” in this sense, expresses a relation, and thus it involves always 
food and the animal. Now, I am a father on account of something in me, 
that generative act, and also on account of the human being that was 
generated from that act. Likewise, it seems that food is healthy on account 
of the food itself, some quality or property or characteristic it has, and on 
account of the animal, whose health is preserved by the food. ?e same 
thing can be healthy for one person and not healthy for another. Wheat 
bread is healthy for me, but not healthy for a person with Celiac disease, 
but this is on account of something in the wheat bread itself—namely, 
gluten—and something in the person, such as a de>ciency in their immune 
system. 
Application to “True” Said of !ings
Now it seems that it is this alternative understanding of a dual implication 
of “healthy” as said of food which Aquinas is carrying over to illuminate 
“true” as said of things. With respect to true, there is also this dual implica-
tion, these two ingredients or two causes: namely, an intellect and a thing. 
As with “healthy” as said of food, which always involves a relation or order 
of food to some animal, “true” as said of things always involves a relation of 
a thing to some intellect. Now, just as food is called healthy on account of 
the health of the animal, as Aquinas says in the >rst part of the distinction 
in the passage under examination, so a thing is called true on account of 
the truth in the human or divine intellect. But just as food is truly called 
healthy also on account of some property or quality of the food itself,20 
but taken always in relation to the animal, so also a thing is called true on 
account of something in the thing itself, namely, its entity or form, but 
taken always in relation to some intellect, in other words, without drop-
ping the opposite term of the relation, which seems to be what Aquinas 
19  ?is is a very important clari>cation, since “healthy” can be said in other ways 
where a relation is not implied, as when the animal is said to be healthy.
20  But as noted earlier, this reason for calling food healthy comes a_er in the order of 
our knowledge, since we usually know causes a_erezects. 
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says in the passage itself under the second part of the distinction: “but from 
the truth which is in the thing itself, which is nothing other than the entity 
conformed to an intellect or conforming an intellect to itself.”21 
And so, food is called healthy both on account of a form that is not 
inherent in the food, but rather in the animal, namely, the health of the 
animal, and also on account of a form that is inherent in the food, namely, 
some quality, property, characteristic, or element of the food itself. ?e 
same applies to “true” as said of things. “True” is said of a thing both on 
account of the truth of some intellect, a form not inherent in a thing, but 
rather in some intellect, and also on account of the entity of the thing 
related via conformity to some intellect, the entity understood as a form 
inherent in the thing. In sum, “true” said of a thing involves a non-inherent 
form and an inherent form, just as “healthy” said of food involves a non-in-
herent form and an inherent form. 
?erefore, when Aquinas says that “true” is said of a thing on account of 
an inherent form, just as “healthy” is said of food on account of an inher-
ent form, he does not mean that the inherent form in food on account of 
21  In the following text from a later article, Aquinas again includes, perhaps more 
explicitly and clearly, these two elements of the truth of a thing. DV, q. 1, a. 8, 
resp. “It ought to be said that in created things truth is found in things and in 
the understanding as is clear from the aforesaid, in the understanding, indeed, 
according as they are conformed to the things whose notion it has, but in things 
according as they imitate the divine understanding, which is their measure just 
as art is the measure of all things that are made through art, and in another way 
according as they are naturally apt to cause a true grasp of themselves in the human 
understanding, which is measured by things as is said in Metaphysics X. Now, a 
thing, actually existing outside the soul, through its own form imitates the art of 
the divine understanding, and through the same form is naturally apt to cause true 
knowledge in the human understanding, through which form any thing whatso-
ever also has being [esse]. Wherefore, the truth of actually existing things includes in 
its own notion/de%nition [ratione] their entity and adds on a relation of conformity 
either to the human understanding or to the divine understanding” (my emphasis). 
?e next text is from DV q. 1, a. 10, in reply to the third objection on the contrary. 
Aquinas distinguishes a twofold perfection in things and its connection to truth in 
things. Again, it is taught that the notion of “truth in things” is constituted by two 
elements, the form of a thing and its relation to either the divine or human under-
standing: “To the third, it ought to be said that perfection is twofold; namely, >rst 
and second. ?e >rst perfection is the form of each single thing, through which it 
has being; wherefore from it no thing fails while it remains; the second perfection 
is operation, which is the end of a thing, or that through which it reaches the end, 
and from this perfection sometimes a thing fails. Now, from the >rst perfection 
results the notion of truth in things, for from this, that a thing has a form, it 
imitates the art of the divine intellect, and gives birth to knowledge of itself in the 
soul.” 
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which it is called healthy alone su\ces to call food healthy, as the round 
shape of and in the tennis ball alone su\ces to call the ball round or the 
whiteness of and in the man alone su\ces to say he is white; he means, 
rather, as examined above, an inherent form, such as calcium in the milk, 
insofar as related to the health of the animal, such as the bone structure of 
the animal. Likewise, he does not mean that the inherent form in a thing 
on account of which it is called true alone su\ces to call a thing true; he 
means rather an inherent form, namely, the entity of a thing, insofar as 
related to the truth of some intellect. Again, this is exactly what Aquinas 
says in the text itself: “sed a veritate quae est in ipsa re, quae nihil aliud 
est quam entitas intellectui adaequata [‘conformed with the intellect’ 
in Dewan’s translation] vel intellectum sibi adaequans [‘conforming the 
intellect to itself ’ in Dewan’s translation].”
But then Dewan sees this as a contradiction in Aquinas’s text: “Yet, at 
the same time, this ‘in itself ’ consideration of the thing, as to its entity, 
is also said to concern the thing’s being ‘conformed with the intellect’ 
(presumably the divine intellect) and also ‘conforming the intellect to 
itself ’ (presumably the human intellect). ?omas seems here to be aiming 
both not to take the thing in relation to intellect and also to take it in rela-
tion to intellect!”22 So, Dewan says that Aquinas seems to be both taking 
the thing in relation to the truth of some intellect when he says, “entitas 
intellectui adaequata vel intellectum sibi adaequans,” and not taking the 
thing in relation to the truth of some intellect when he gives the example 
of healthy said of food as from an inherent form, which Dewan interprets 
as Aquinas calling food healthy not in relation to the health of the animal 
but only from itself. But it has been argued that Aquinas cannot correctly 
be understood as doing the second. If so, then the apparent contradiction 
is dissolved. 
?is apparently contradictory text actually seems to give some support 
to the alternative way of interpreting this text as presented above. Just 
as Aquinas is explicitly not taking the entity of a thing just in itself, as 
Dewan thinks he does because of the “healthy” example that comes at the 
end, so Aquinas is not taking food just in itself apart from any relation 
to the health of the animal. In both cases, he is taking them in relation 
to another, even though that relation is not explicitly made as regards the 
quality of the food, as it is with regard to the entity of a thing, but it can be 
understood to be there, as has been argued. 
22  Dewan, “Is Truth a Transcendental for St. ?omas Aquinas?,” 11. 
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Alternative Reading of the Text Based on Other Texts throughout 
Aquinas’s Works
Perhaps another argument against Dewan’s “true solely by an inherent 
form apart from a relation to some intellect” interpretation regards Aqui-
nas’s general but seemingly consistent understanding of truth throughout 
his works, namely, that intellect is included in the very notion of truth. 
In DV, q. 1, a. 2, which is presupposed by article 4 of the same question, 
he says in the context of answering the question whether truth is chiey 
found in the intellect or in things that, if “either intellect [i.e., the divine 
and the human] were understood to be removed although things remained 
through an impossible supposition, in no way would the de>nition/notion 
of truth remain.” In other texts, Aquinas insists on truth being primarily in 
the intellect and in things only in relation to some intellect. For example, 
in ST I, q. 16, a. 1., which answers the same question as DV, q. 1, a. 2, 
Aquinas again points out that “it is necessary that the de>nition of true be 
derived from the intellect to the thing understood so that even the thing 
understood is called true according as it has some order to an intellect.” In 
ST I, q. 16, a. 3, he says, “just as good adds the notion of desirable above 
being, so also true [adds] a comparison to an intellect,” which is what he 
already teaches back in his Commentary on the Sentences, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad. 
2: “Just as goodness expresses the notion through which essence is ordered 
to the appetite, so truth expresses the notion through which essence is 
ordered to the intellect.”23 In ST I, q. 17, a. 1, he says: “Since the true and 
the false are opposed, and opposites are about the same, it is necessary that 
falsity >rst be found there where >rst truth is found: this is in the intellect. 
But in things, there is neither truth nor falsity except through an order 
to the intellect.” ?erefore, there seems to be some evidence throughout 
Aquinas’s works that truth implies some order to the intellect.24 
23  In the same text, but in his reply to the third objection Aquinas also says, “just as 
‘one’ adds the idea [rationem] of undividedness, and ‘good’ the idea [rationem] of 
an end, and ‘true’ the idea [rationem] of an order to knowledge.” 
24  See, e.g., In I de interp., lec. 3: “For the true, as the philosopher says in Ethics 6, 
is the good of the intellect. Hence, of whatever true is said, it is necessary that it 
be through a respect/relation to the intellect” (translated from the Latin editio 
altera retractata in vol. 1 of the Leonine ed.). ?is sounds like the way Aquinas 
explains whatever “healthy” is said of. ?e medicine, the urine, and the food are 
all called healthy in relation to one thing, the health of the animal. It is necessary 
that, of whatever “healthy” is said, that this be through a relation to the health of 
the animal. ?erefore, intellect is to whatever “true” is said of, as the health of the 
animal is to whatever “healthy” is said of. So, just as everything is called healthy 
because of some relation to an animal’s health, so everything is called true because 
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And even if Dewan were correct in claiming that there was in Aquinas 
some truth which did not involve in some way a relation to an intellect, it 
seems that in even more general terms “true” or truth for Aquinas involves 
a comparison, order, or relation of one thing to another. In speaking 
of “good,” “true,” and “one” with respect to being in a passage from his 
Commentary on the Sentences  Aquinas says that “true and good add a 
certain relation.”25 In d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, of the same commentary (on part I), 
he says that the ratio veritatis consists in a relatio adaequationis.26 In his 
commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, he says that “truth and falsity consist 
in a certain comparison of one [thing] to another.”27 Close to the previous 
text is DV, q. 1, a. 1, where Aquinas places good and true under one of two 
ways of understanding a general mode that follows every being (ens). ?e 
>rst way is insofar as the general mode follows each being (ens) in itself 
(“uno modo secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in se”); the 
second way is insofar as the general mode follows one being (ens) as ordered 
to another (“alio modo secundum quod consequitur unum ens in ordine ad 
aliud”). ?e second way is further subdivided: in one way according to a 
division of one thing from another; in another way according to an agree-
ment of one being to another.28 Under the latter are found “good” and 
“true.” Good and true express a mode of being that follows every being as 
related to another. Aquinas seems to be saying therefore that order or rela-
tion of one to another is of the very essence of the true, more speci>cally, 
the relation of convenientia, which can be translated as agreement, >tness, 
suitability, or correspondence. “?e name good expresses the convenien-
tiam of a being to the appetite, whence in the beginning of the Ethics it 
is said that ‘the good is what all desire’, but the name true expresses the 
convenientiam of a being to the intellect.”29 It seems that Aquinas does not, 
throughout all his works, depart from a relational understanding of truth, 
of some relation to an intellect.
  In his commentary on the Gospel of John, he says, “for truth of its own de>nition 
[de sui ratione] implies a commensuration of a thing to an understanding” (Super 
Ioan 18, lec. 6; translated from the Marietti ed. as found at corpusthomisticum.
org).
25  In I sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3: “But the others which we said, namely, good, true and one, 
add above being, not indeed some nature, but some notion/intelligibility: but one 
adds the notion of indivision, and because of this is closest to being, because it adds 
only negation: but true and good add a certain relation.” 
26  In I sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1. 
27  In III de an., ch. 5. 
28  DV, q. 1, a. 1. 
29  DV, q. 1, a. 1.
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and where it seems that he may, as in DV, q. 1, a. 4, careful consideration 
seems to show otherwise. 
It seems that the fact that Dewan >nds this startling teaching of Aqui-
nas only in this passage from DV, and nowhere else, as Dewan says, is a 
sign that perhaps Dewan’s interpretation of it needs to be reconsidered in 
light of what Aquinas says everywhere else. In other words, this being the 
only passage with such a teaching does not seem to favor Dewan’s inter-
pretation. 
In sum, therefore, there seem to be many reasons against interpreting 
Aquinas at DV, q. 1, a. 4 to be saying what Dewan says Aquinas is saying, 
namely, that “truth is a form inherent in things,” which means that things 
can be called true not on account of a relation to some intellect but just on 
account of something inherent or intrinsic to the thing itself, namely, their 
entity, just as a man is called white not on account of a relation to some-
thing other than the man himself, but just on account of something inher-
ent or intrinsic to the man himself, namely, the color of his skin: like the 
whiteness of a man, truth would be an intrinsic formal feature of things. 
Dewan’s understanding of Aquinas’s use of “healthy” as said of food in the 
DV passage, which underlies his claim about Aquinas thinking there that 
truth is an intrinsic formal feature of things, does not seem to be the only 
way of understanding Aquinas in that text. 
Now, if Aquinas is not teaching at DV, q. 1, a. 4, that truth is a form 
inherent in things, then the basis of Dewan’s claim for thinking that there 
is a development in Aquinas’s teaching on the truth of things as one moves 
from DV to ST may have to be reconsidered. For, according to Dewan, 
before ST, “de>nitely” in that DV article, Aquinas teaches that truth is a 
form inherent in things, but in ST Aquinas no longer thinks that truth is 
a form inherent in things. Aquinas’s account of truth, though having real 
and obvious dizerences in his dizerent systematic treatments of truth, 
seems to be more uni>ed than Dewan seems to portray it, especially as 
regards Aquinas’s understanding of “true” as said of things. N&V
